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1.
Appl Biosaf ; 28(1): 43-54, 2023 Mar 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2261881

ABSTRACT

Introduction: In response to a series of biosafety incidents in 2014, the White House directed two high-level expert committees to analyze biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories and make recommendations for work with select agents and toxins. Overall, they recommended 33 actions to address areas related to national biosafety, including promoting a culture of responsibility, oversight, outreach and education, applied biosafety research, incident reporting, material accountability, inspection processes, regulations and guidelines, and determining the necessary number of high-containment laboratories in the United States. Methods: The recommendations were collected and grouped into categories previously defined by the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee. Open-source materials were examined to determine what actions had been taken to address the recommendations. The actions taken were compared against the reasoning provided in the committee reports to determine if the concerns were sufficiently addressed. Results: In this study, we found that 6 recommendations were not addressed and 11 were insufficiently addressed out of 33 total recommended actions. Discussion and Conclusion: Further work is needed to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories handling regulated pathogens (biological select agents and toxins [BSAT]). These carefully considered recommendations should now be enacted, including determining if there is sufficient high-containment laboratory space for response to a future pandemic, developing a sustained applied biosafety research program to improve our understanding of how high-containment research should be performed, bioethics training to educate the regulated community on the consequences of unsafe practices in BSAT research, and the creation of a no-fault incident reporting system for biological incidents, which may inform and improve biosafety training. Significance: The work presented in this study is significant because previous incidents that occurred in Federal laboratories highlighted shortcomings in the Federal Select Agent Program and the Select Agent Regulations. Progress was made on implementing recommendations to address the shortcomings, but efforts were lost or forgotten over time. The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a brief window of interest in biosafety and biosecurity, and an opportunity to address these shortcomings to increase readiness for future disease emergencies.

2.
EMBO Rep ; 22(10): e53739, 2021 10 05.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1414043

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic has rekindled debates about gain-of-function experiments. This is an opportunity to clearly define safety risks and appropriate countermeasures.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Containment of Biohazards , Gain of Function Mutation , Humans , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2
3.
Ann Intern Med ; 174(7): 1014-1015, 2021 07.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1384006
4.
mSphere ; 6(3)2021 05 12.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1226714

ABSTRACT

Serology (antibody) tests to detect previous SARS-CoV-2 infection have been in high demand from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The initial shortage of diagnostic tests coupled with asymptomatic infections led to a significant demand for serology tests to identify past infections. Despite serious limitations on the interpretation of a positive antibody test in terms of immunity to SARS-CoV-2, antibody testing was initially considered for release from social distancing, return to employment, and "immunity passports." The regulatory approach to antibody tests was limited; manufacturers were encouraged to develop and market antibody tests without submitting validation data to the FDA. FDA guidance grew more stringent, but many poor-quality tests were already on the market-potentially inappropriately used for individual decision-making. This is a case study describing COVID-19 serology tests and the U.S. market and describes lessons learned for a future health security crisis.


Subject(s)
Antibodies, Viral/blood , COVID-19 Serological Testing/methods , COVID-19/diagnosis , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2/immunology , Asymptomatic Infections , COVID-19 Serological Testing/history , COVID-19 Serological Testing/standards , Forecasting , Health Policy , Health Services Needs and Demand , History, 21st Century , Humans , Immunoglobulin G/blood , Immunoglobulin M/blood , Marketing of Health Services , Politics , Quality Control , Sensitivity and Specificity , United States , United States Food and Drug Administration , Validation Studies as Topic
5.
Trends Microbiol ; 29(3): 214-223, 2021 03.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-912642

ABSTRACT

Antibody tests for detecting past infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) have many uses for public health decision making, but demand has largely come from individual consumers. This review focuses on the individual relevance of antibody tests: their accuracy in detecting prior infection, what past SARS-CoV-2 infection can currently infer about future immunity or possible medical sequelae, and the potential future importance of antibody tests for vaccine selection and medical screening. Given uncertainty about the antibody tests (quality, accuracy level, positive predictive value) and what those tests might indicate immunologically (durability of antibodies and necessity for protection from reinfection), seropositive test results should not be used to inform individual decision making, and antibody testing should remain a tool of public health at this time.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 Serological Testing/methods , COVID-19/diagnosis , COVID-19/immunology , SARS-CoV-2/immunology , Decision Making , Humans , Public Health
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